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ABSTRACT

The widespread success of charter school legislation has fostered a
perception that charter schooling is apolitical and has clouded our
understanding of the politics of the issue. In a case study of Virginia's
charter school program, we suggest that three important political variables
have been largely overlooked to date. The "weak" form of Virginia's
charter school legislation can be attributed in large part to: (1) the schism
between the educationally privileged communities of Northern Virginia
and those of the rest of the state, (2) the lack of a perceived educational
crisis, and (3) the vocal presence of minority opposition. Teacher
organizations did not strongly oppose charter school legislation, but they
worked to ensure that legislation would be mild. In examining the political
gestation of Virginia's "weak" charter school law, this study complements
existing work that has generally concentrated on "strong" laws in states
like Arizona, Colorado, and Michigan. The struggle for passage in
Virginia illuminates many tensions less evident in states where charter
schooling passed more easily.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, charter schooling emerged as perhaps the most
prominent reform in American education. 63 By early 2000, thirty-six states
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Charter schooling seeks to supplement the traditional model of district-operated public

schools with schools that are authorized to operate independently of the local school
district. Charter schools are funded on a per pupil basis, with funding contingent on the
number of students a school is able to attract. The charter-authorizing entities are
responsible for screening potential schools and then holding them accountable for their
performance and operations. Depending on the state law and the decisions of the
"authorizer," many or most state regulations are waived for charter schools. However,
charter schools are still public schools and are therefore required to accept all applicants
and to abide by federal and constitutional strictures regarding religion, children with

and Washington, D.C. had adopted some form of charter school
legislation, and roughly 1,700 charter schools were operating across the
country. 64 As one might expect, efforts to pass charter legislation in the
various states have been as much about political conflict as about abstract
notions of desirable policy. Nevertheless, while scholars have made
65
admirable contributions addressing issues of program design,
accountability, 66 operational concerns, 67 and who attends charter
schools, 68 comprehensive accounts of the politics of charter schooling
have been less common.
Charter school statutes are the consequence of state legislative activity,
and are frequently subject to subsequent amendment and tweaking.
Charter schools themselves may be administered and regulated by various
state agencies, whose own political dynamics may have important
implications for educational outcomes. For these reasons, further attention
to the politics of charter schooling is essential if we are to understand the
nature and anticipate the effects of charter school reforms. Moreover,
scholars who have examined the politics of charter school legislation have
tended to focus on states such as Arizona,69 Colorado,70 and Michigan, 7 '
special needs, and so on. Charter applicants are often disaffected public school teachers
or principals, and they generally wish to open a school with a particular vision or focus.
The promise of charter schooling is that it will alleviate concerns regarding district
bureaucracy and unresponsiveness, permit new and specialized schools to open, offer
more choice to parents and students, foster new models of schooling, enhance school
accountability, and encourage competitive pressure that will compel traditional schools to
improve.
64 See OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC.,
THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000 (Beryl Nelson et al. eds. 2000) [hereinafter
OERI].
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Association Annual Meeting (Sept. 2-5, 1999); Sandra Vergari, The Regulatory Styles of
Charter School Authorizers, Address at the American Political Science Association
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where more aggressive legislation has been enacted. Developments in the
states where activism has been less pronounced have received far less
academic scrutiny. This tendency to focus on activity rather than on nonevents is nothing new in political science, 72 but it has the potential to
create an uneven understanding of the processes governing charter school
legislation and implementation.
In this paper we seek, with full recognition of the limits of a single
case study, to help address this empirical gap by providing a case study of
the passage and implementation of 1998 charter school legislation in
Virginia. 73 The Commonwealth's version was a relatively weak and
largely symbolic bill that had not produced the authorization of a single
charter school by the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. 74 In some
sense, of course, these outcomes make the Virginia experience less
educationally significant. On the other hand, given that during the relevant
period Virginia had two strong, conservative governors, growing
Republican strength in the state legislature, government leaders willing to
fight for charter schools, and a "right to work" climate which essentially
rendered teacher unions a non-factor, a more careful scrutiny of the
legislative process may help us understand why some states may easily
embrace the charter schooling concept while others, like Virginia, do not.
In particular, the passage of "weak" legislation in the midst of this
charter school-friendly environment suggests the role of three variables
which have received relatively little attention: (1) an intrastate conflict
between high-achieving school districts and other school districts, (2) the
lack of a perceived educational crisis, and (3) the vocal presence of
minority opposition.

LEGISLATING CHARTER SCHOOLS

Previous work has addressed the role played by entrepreneurs, as well
as by social and institutional factors, in shaping the outcomes of charter
school legislation and school formation. 75 Previous scholars have found
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that policy networks and the strength of advocacy groups shape the
prospects for charter school legislation. 76 Others have suggested that
charter passage is influenced by contextual factors such as the maturity of
the proposed legislation, whether the state is in an election year, and
whether neighboring states have considered charter legislation.77 Such
systematic work has contributed significantly to helping us understand
how individual actors, patterns of diffusion, and legislative characteristics
affect charter school activity.
78
Other works have sought to focus more on the role of context.
Hassel, in an overview of all fifty states and accompanying case studies of
charter school legislation in four states, found that Republican strength, a
weak teacher union, low National Assessment of Educational Progress
("NAEP") test scores, a moralistic political culture, a high median income,
and an urban population all made the passage of charter legislation more
likely. 7 9 In a less systematic study, Morken and Formicola examined
choice politics in a variety of contexts and found that advocate resources,
the strength of the religious right, the presence of alternative options, and
the perceived performance of schools all appeared relevant to the
prospects of choice proposals. 80 Examining the background of the Arizona
statute, Timmons-Brown and Hess found that a conservative climate,
Republican strength in the legislature, a Republican governor, a weakened
teacher's union, and perceived educational inadequacy all helped to
produce one of the nation's "strongest" charter school laws. 81 We seek to
augment this existing body of work, particularly by examining potentially
significant cultural factors, like racial division and regional differences,
that may not be apparent in more systematic work and that may be less
evident in states that embraced charter schooling more readily.

In education, where divergent goals and ambiguous outcomes tend to
foster an emphasis on symbolic politics, 82 political interests are
particularly sensitive to context and appearances. For instance, because
there is extensive disagreement about how to objectively measure
76 See Mintrom, School Choice, supra note 13; Mintrom, Entrepreneurs,supra note 13;
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educational conditions, 83 differences in perceived school quality can alter
the political landscape. Policymakers may feel compelled to act, or to
advocate certain legislation, even when the specific alternatives may run
counter to the apparent preferences of the legislative majority. An
example of such action is common in the realm of charter schooling,
where legislatures have been hesitant to embrace radical choice-based
remedies but also hesitant to ignore such proposals. As a consequence,
they have often settled84 upon various forms of charter schooling as an
agreeable compromise.
One result of such compromise has been the incorporation of a wide
85
array of charter school laws under the umbrella of "charter schooling."
Such measures span from radical designs that create wide-open
educational markets to modest designs that offer less regulatory freedom
than magnet schooling. 86 Bierlein offers a widely utilized typology that
identifies seven key dimensions which
can be used to assess the relative
87
strength of charter school legislation:
1] A charter school must be allowed to seek sponsorship
from a public entity other than a local school board and/or
be allowed
to appeal a school board decision to another
88
body;
2] Any individual or group should be
allowed to develop
89
proposal;
school
and submit a charter
3] Charter schools must automatically be exempt from
most state laws, regulations, and local policies (except
health, safety, civil rights, and fiscal and pupil
accountability) ;90
4] Charter schools must have full control over funds
generated
by its student count, including control over
91
salaries;
92
5] Charter schools must have legal autonomy;
6] There should be no limits on the number of93charter
schools that can be established within a given state;
7] Charter schools
must be permitted to employ non94
certified teachers.
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In light of these criteria, it is clear that the 1998 Virginia charter school
legislation signed into law by Governor James Gilmore was exceptionally
weak. The legislation mandated that charters could be granted only by the
local school district, made it difficult for charter schools to escape many
state laws and regulations, limited the number of permissible schools, and
required that charter schools use certified teachers. 95 In fact, the Virginia
legislation met just two of the seven criteria (see Table 1), and both of
those measures--regarding who could start charter schools and the fiscal
autonomy of schools--included limiting provisions. 96 In short, the Virginia

case illustrates how five years of political combat resulted in a symbolic
and largely hollow "victory" for charter school advocates.
Table 1: Comparison of Bierlein's Index with Virginia's Charter School
Law
Bierlein's Charter School Components

Virginia Law

1. A charter school must be allowed to seek
sponsorship from a public entity other than a local
school board and/or be allowed to appeal a school
board decision.

NO

2. Any individual or group should be allowed to
develop and submit a charter school proposal.

YES*
3. Charter schools must automatically be exempt
from most state laws, regulations, and local
policies.

NO

4. Fiscal autonomy - school has control over funds
generated by its student count.

YES**

5. Legal autonomy - teachers are school, not
district employees.

NO
6. No limits on the number of charter schools that
can be formed.

NO
7. Charter schools must be permitted to employ
non-certified teachers.

NO
*Conversion of a private, nonpublic, religious, or home-based program into a charter
school program is prohibited.
**Student count funds are provided, but other funding details must be negotiated with the
contract.

95 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5 to 22.1-212.13 (2000).
96See id. § 22.1-212.6; § 22.1-212.8.

METHODOLOGY

This case study was primarily assembled through documentary
research of newspaper archives and state documents and through
interviews with more than two dozen participants and observers. One of
the authors worked for the Virginia legislature during the spring 1999
session, permitting him to observe first-hand the dynamics of that body
and to speak with numerous legislators and staffers regarding the politics
and passage of charter school legislation.

CHARTER SCHOOLING IN VIRGINIA

The Virginia debate over charter schooling ran, with varying intensity,
from 1994 through the final enactment of legislation in 1998. 97
Ultimately, the success of charter school legislation rested upon broad
support among a bipartisan coalition of legislators, 98 a coalition that
looked very different from the Republican minority that first pushed
charter schooling in 1994. The growth of support was the result of three
key factors: Republican electoral success in legislative races in the 1990s,
modifications to the charter school legislation that broadened its appeal,
and changes in the larger climate of the state and national debate over
charter schooling.
Entering the 1990s, Virginia had been staunchly Democratic since
Reconstruction. As late as 1975, Republicans held just seventeen of 100
seats in the state House of Delegates and five of forty seats in the state
Senate. 9 9 While national GOP candidates fared well in the state, as they
did across the South, Democrats continued to hold a sizable advantage in
the state legislature until a rising tide of
southern Republicanism finally
100
posed a serious threat in the early 1990s.
A Charter School Advocate Becomes Governor
Following three consecutive Democratic governors, former U.S.
representative George Allen, son of the popular former Washington
Redskins coach, upset the favored Democratic candidate to win the 1993
gubernatorial election. One key educational proposal Allen championed in
97 See generally Pamela Stallsmith & Tyler Witley, Charter Schools Get Nod. Senate
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U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va.), Vot. 75, No. 4 (1999).
100 Larry Sabato, The 1995 Elections: Running in Place, Virginia Newsletter (Weldon
Cooper Center for Pub. Service, U. of Va., Charlottesville, Va.), Vol. 72, No. 1 (1996).

his staunchly conservative campaign was charter schooling.'' Allen had
extensive coattails in his surprising landslide, bringing the Republicans
within three seats of a majority in both the state Senate and the House of
Delegates (see Table 2). Republican gains meant that legislative
Republicans would be able to substantively influence the state's policy
agenda for the first time in memory.
In his first year, Allen combatively wielded his immense popularity.
The new governor leaned on the General Assembly to enact legislation on
a variety of conservative concerns, including such issues as parole reform
and educational accountability. Allen's tactics drew the ire of many
Richmond Democrats, making his charter school plan--from the start--a
target for hostile legislators.
The educational accountability program, popularly known as the
Standards of Learning ("SOLs"), would prove significant in the charter
school fight. Their enactment sent a convincing signal that serious steps
had been taken to ensure school quality, although concerns would later
emerge about the validity and the fairness of the tests, distracting attention
from other educational reforms. Championed by Allen, the SOLs and the
attached proficiency tests generated national attention. 10 2 The Standards of
Learning, first adopted in June 1995, the SOLs set forth specific criteria
for English, History and Social Science, Mathematics, and Science, and
the Board of Education developed relevant proficiency tests. 10 3 Beginning
with the class of 2004, each highschool student will be required to pass
end-of-course tests in order to graduate. The SOLs law
has been
10 4
schools.
charter
including
schools,
all
to
apply
interpreted to
Table 2: Membership in the Virginia General Assembly, 1990-1999
House of Delegates
Year(s)

]Democrat

1990-

] State Senate
Republican

Independent

Democrat

Independent

61

37

2

30

10

58

41

122

91105
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9 3 106

1994-

1

52

95 107

1996-
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-1

47

1

1

152

147
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1

1
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Amidst his generally contentious relationship with the Democratically
controlled General Assembly, Allen staked out a controversial educational
stance when he refused federal funds from the national Goals 2000
program. Allen argued that federal conditions attached to the aid would1
give federal bureaucrats unacceptable influence on the state's schools."'
Democratic critics attacked Allen for choosing to sacrifice $8 million in
aid over two years for the sake of ideology. 112 This charged and combative
relationship would color the statewide educational debate throughout
Allen's administration, particularly on a policy as partisan as school
choice. 113

The state educational situation was also confused by the fact that
legislation enacted in 1995 permitted localities to elect their school boards
for the first time. Consequently, across the state, new boards composed of
amateur and sometimes highly political members were114seated, offering a
combustible new component to the education equation.
The Fight for Passage
In the wake of Allen's victory, Delegate Philip Hamilton, a Republican
educator from Newport News and a member of the House Education
Committee, introduced an original charter school bill in 1994. 115 His
version, a blueprint of the plan eventually enacted in 1998,116 represented
a middle ground between a "weaker" plan supported by Democratic
Delegate Mitch Van Yahres of Charlottesville and a "stronger" plan
backed by Governor Allen. 117 The legislation sponsored by Van Yahres
would have restricted the creation of charter schools to existing public
1996-1997 Va. Sec'y Commonwealth Rep. 278-321.
109 1997-1998 Va. Sec'y Commonwealth Rep. 280-323.
110 1998-1999 Va. Sec'y Commonwealth Rep. 280-323.
108
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See id. (noting that in the end, Allen did accept the money after two years of
wrangling).
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schools and made the creation of any charter school contingent on support
from both the local school board and the state Board of Education, 1 18 with
approval also requiring an endorsement from the local school board. This
plan received strong Democratic backing, as it allowed legislators to back
activity without altering existing school practice in any significant way.
Of the two major Republican plans proposed, Hamilton's plan was
considerably weaker than Allen's. The Governor's plan featured included a
"superwaiver" provision that would release charter schools from state
regulations, including the Standards of Accreditation, and provided state
funds to defray start-up costs. The bill did not limit the number of charter
schools that could be started. Charter school teachers would not be
required to hold teacher licenses, and those public school teachers who
moved to charter schools and then lost their jobs would not be guaranteed
the chance to resume their previous non-charter assignment. 119 Educators
and Democratic leaders fiercely criticized the Allen plan, 120 in part
because, for electoral purposes, they felt it necessary to derail the Allen
agenda after the governor's string of 1994 victories.
Hamilton's strategy was to enlist the support of educational
associations by requiring licensing of teachers in charter schools,
providing for the return of teachers to the regular public school system if
they lost their position in a charter school, permitting local school districts
to reject charter school applications, and limiting the number of charter
schools to no more than ten per district. 12 1 This compromise was
prompted by two sources of opposition. First, many localities feared too
much control by a state Board of Education dominated by Allen
appointees or that an Allen-controlled Board would be too aggressive in
approving charters. 122 Second, the influential northern Virginia suburbs-which elect approximately one-fourth of the legislature--feared that a
more open system would potentially
permit interlopers to damage their
123
systems.
school
highly regarded
The 1995 legislative session marked the first significant clash over
charter schooling. With all 140 seats up for election in the General
Assembly in the fall and his successful 1994 behind him, Allen pushed
several pieces of legislation that he thought would help Republicans gain
the seats necessary to control the legislature. The charter school bill,
carried in the House of Delegates by Jay Katzen and in the Senate by
118
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124

Brandon Bell,
was one key element in this push. At the time, nineteen
states had approved charter legislation. 125 Roughly 240 charter schools
12 7
126
with approximately 110 in operation.
had been approved nationwide,
Allen's proposal monopolized the attention devoted to charter
schooling--leaving the other two proposals largely unnoticed. Backing for
Hamilton on the House Education Committee was led by senior
committee Republican James Dillard II of Fairfax as well as by
Democratic Committee Chair Paul Councill of Franklin and Alan
Diamonstein of Newport News. Councill supported charter schools to help
bolster achievement in the poor rural area he represented, 128 while Dillard
believed charter schools would help the poor, disadvantaged minorities
129
who were being ill-served in the public schools of the state's cities.
Despite the influential backing Hamilton's efforts received, fierce
opposition to the Allen bill left all three charter bills languishing in
committee without a vote. The pressure to take some action led the
General Assembly to pass joint resolutions calling for a study of charter
schools.' 30 The study, House Document No. 43, was prepared for the
1996 session.
The Role of Race and Region
Charter efforts gained support from child advocacy groups and the
state parent-teacher association. These groups were particularly interested
in the opportunity to help special needs students by chartering innovative
schools.' 3 Charters were also supported by the Virginia Congress of PTA
and the Professional Teachers Association, 132 and the Virginia Education
Association backed charter schooling in principle. Meanwhile, opposition
was led by the Virginia School Boards Association, the Virginia
Association of School Superintendents, and the National Association for
1 33
the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP").
While some advocates argued that charter schooling could aid illserved minority students, vocal opponents pointed to Virginia's history
with race academies in the 1950s when it sought to resist desegregation in
124
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132 Hamilton, supra note 58, at A11.
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the post-Brown era as illustrative of the dangers posed by charter
schooling. Charter school opponents held up the experience of race
academies as symbolic of the dangers posed by school choice programs
generally. 134 Within the General Assembly, opposition to charter schools
was led by Democratic legislators who depicted school choice plans as
elitist, discriminatory, and a distraction from other educational
priorities. 135 Democratic Delegate Jerrauld C. Jones of Norfolk, chairman
of the Black Caucus, helped to lead the opposition to charter school
legislation. 136 Jones, along with the state 3NAACP,
launched extensive
7
campaigns to derail the charter school push.1
The NAACP, which viewed charter school legislation as segregationist
and likely to hurt the education offered to poor minorities in Virginia,
supplied the most outspoken opposition to the charter school plans from
1994 until after the 1997 elections, when it dropped its opposition to
Hamilton's modified, compromise legislation. Salim Khalfani, activities
coordinator for the Virginia NAACP, saw charter schools as a covert
attempt "to use public school money
to create private entities that will
38
benefit an elite group of people."1
Crucially, legislators from Northern Virginia--outside of Delegate
Dillard--were generally unresponsive to charter schooling. Just four of the
region's legislators, Dillard and O'Brien in the House and Barry and
Woods in the Senate, supported charter schooling. All four were
Republicans, and these four represented barely ten percent of the Northern
Virginia delegation. 139 In particular, legislators from the wealthy and
nationally-acclaimed school systems of Fairfax, Arlington, and Alexandria
were hostile to any innovations that threatened to undermine or disturb
their highly regarded schools. 140 These legislators expressed private fears
that good students would be "cherry-picked," that fragile compromises
14 1
would be undermined, and that public school funding would suffer.
The fact that Northern Virginia legislators made up roughly one-fourth
of the legislature and were prominent in both parties helped blunt the push
134
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for charter schooling. Specifically, Northern Virginia legislators were
hesitant to be linked to a bill that might later be blamed for having
damaged schools which consistently graduated above-average numbers of
students with above-average test scores
and sent them on to prestigious
14 2
colleges at an exceptionally high rate.
Charter school opponents such as Democratic Delegate Jim Scott
sought to draw on the lack of empirical evidence to suggest the riskiness
of the proposals. Scott proposed that the funds proposed for charter
schooling be used instead on proven programs such as teacher training,
reducing class size, or Head Start. 14 3 Democratic Delegate Marian
VanLandingham of Alexandria saw little need for charter schools. "I think
we have the flexibility to take care of some special needs now. We don't
want to pull the resources of public education away for what is essentially
private education."' 144 Democratic Delegate Shirley Cooper of Yorktown
worried that passing a bill on charter schools would open a "Pandora's
box" for future amendments introducing measures such as school
1 45
vouchers.
School board members and superintendents generally opposed charter
schools, arguing that charter schools would draw off existing resources
and become exclusive schools for students of well-off parents. 146 The
chair of the Henrico County School Board termed charter schools "a
private school setting with public school funds."' 147 Many city schools
were opposed to the measure because they worried charters drain needed
resources from the public schools. "Give us the money for more teachers
so we can have smaller classes," said Melvin Law, chairman of the
Richmond School Board. 14 8 "We need to be concerned about the vast
majority of students, not just one group."'14 9 Ironically, Portsmouth City
Schools supported charter school legislation precisely because it hoped it
could use the federal
grant money to bolster its course offerings and
150
financial health.
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The Virginia Education Association ("VEA"), composed primarily of
classroom teachers, stood on the sidelines during the course of much of
the charter school debate between 1994 and 1998. The VEA restricted its
energies to ensuring that any successful legislation include several key
restrictions which would alleviate potential problems while also
weakening the larger impact of any bill. The VEA insisted that legislation
provide for no diversion of current funds from public schools, that it
ensure only the voluntary assignment of faculty to charter schools, that it
offer employment protection for those faculty members during their
service, and that it include safeguards
to assure fiscal accountability and to
151
segregation.
racial
guard against
In 1995, the Republicans again gained seats in both houses of the
legislature. In the House, the Republicans won two new seats, narrowing
the Democratic edge to fifty-one to forty- nine. The Republicans also
claimed two more Senate seats, producing a twenty/twenty tie and a
power-sharing agreement in that body. A crucial outcome of the
agreement was that the Democrats retained an eight to seven majority on
the Senate Education and Health Committee. The new House Education
52
Committee included twelve Democrats and ten Republicans.1
Significantly, one of the few Republican casualties was Brandon Bell,
chief Senate sponsor of Allen's charter school legislation,
who was
1 53
defeated by vocal charter school opponent John Edwards.
The 1996 legislative session proved less heated than the 1995 session.
His party having suffered setbacks in the 1995 elections, Allen adopted a
more temperate approach with the legislature. Meanwhile, Hamilton
worked diligently to distance his plan from Allen's in order to win
moderate Democratic support. In House Bill 776, for which Paul Councill,
the Democratic Chairman of the House Education Committee, agreed to
serve as patron, Hamilton agreed to include language requiring charter
schools to employ licensed teachers and to remain public schools. 154 As a
result, a House subcommittee, for the first time, voted four to two in favor
of recommending charter school legislation. In the House Education
Committee, Councill and one other Democrat backed the bill, while
Republican Delegate Tom Baker, representing a Democratic-leaning
district in Pulaski County, opposed it. The bill was defeated in an eleven
to eleven vote. 155 Meanwhile, during the spring session, New Jersey
became the twentieth state to adopt charter school legislation. Virginia's
charter school advocates remained unable to attract significant bipartisan
support.
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A New Stage in the Fight
The 1997 legislative session marked a new stage in the fight for
charter schooling. Governor Allen was serving his last year and the battle
lines had been clearly drawn. Hamilton again worked hard to distinguish
his bill from the more controversial version previously introduced by
Allen, even as elections loomed in which Democratic charter school
opponent and Lieutenant Governor Don Beyer prepared to face
Republican charter school advocate and Attorney General James Gilmore.
NAACP president Paul Gillis threatened legislative members with defeat
in November if they supported Hamilton's new measure. Gillis said at an
Education Committee hearing at the Capitol on Lee-Jackson-King Day in
1997, "We're going to watch your vote. If you vote against us, we're going
to come after you."' 156 Hamilton angrily counterattacked and accused his
opponents of hiding "behind racist language."' 157 In the end,
Hamilton's
158
bill again failed in Committee on a vote of eleven to eleven.
In the Senate, Republican Warren Barry of Fairfax became the patron
of legislation identical to Hamilton's. 159 In committee the bill lost, eight
votes to seven, on a party line vote. Late in the session, Allen submitted
his own charter school legislation, in part to give the Republicans an issue
for the fall election. Allen's proposal fell on the same eight-to-seven
committee vote in the Senate.
Conservative Republican James Gilmore won the gubernatorial
election in the fall of 1997, largely on the basis of his pledge to abolish the
state's car tax. Education was not a particularly prominent issue in the
election. Democrats narrowly retained control of the House, and the
Senate remained deadlocked twenty to twenty. 160 The election of
Republican businessman John Hager as Lieutenant Governor did mean
that Senate ties would now be broken by a Republican. Before the 1988
legislative session, Gilmore moved to strengthen the Republicans' position
by offering positions in his administration to targeted General Assembly
Democrats. Democratic Senator Charlie Waddell of Loudoun County and
Democratic Delegate David Brickley of Woodbridge, both of whom
served in predominantly Republican districts, were asked to join the new
administration. Gilmore's overtures produced seven special elections
during December and early January, all of which were won by
Republicans. In the end, Republicans finagled a twenty-one to nineteen
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seat majority in the Senate and retained its fifty percent share of the House
of Delegates seats.
After extensive legislative machinations, a power-sharing agreement
was reached in the House of Delegates. All of the House committees
except for the Rules Committee included equal numbers of Republicans
and Democrats and added a Republican co-chair. This agreement was
crucial to the passage of the charter school legislation. The House
Education Committee added two Republicans and promoted senior
Republican Dillard, a charter school advocate, to co-chair. That committee
now had twelve Republicans and twelve Democrats. When the charter
school bill was voted on in 1998, two Democrats still favored the bill and
Republican Baker still opposed it. With two new Republican committee
members, the final tally now ran thirteen to eleven in favor of the
legislation (see Table 3).
Table 3: House Education Committee Membership and Voting Practices
on Charter School Legislation, 1996-1998.
1996-97
sessions161

Democrat

Republican

Vote
Total

Supported
Bill

2

9

11

Opposed
Bill

10

1

11

Total
Membership

12

10

22

1998 Session 162

Democrat

Republican

Vote
Total

Supported Bill

2

11

13

Opposed Bill

10

1

11

Total Membership

12

12

24

In the Senate, five Democratic members of the committee who had
opposed the Hamilton/Barry bill in 1997 switched their positions and
backed the legislation, resulting in a twelve-to-three victory for the charter
school bill. 163 The five included Democratic floor leader Dick Saslaw,
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who said, "I was one of the most ardent foes of charter schools last year,
but I changed my mind after visiting charter schools in Boston." 164 Saslaw
pointed to low test scores in Virginia's inner cities and predicted that
charter schools would benefit disadvantaged inner-city students. Although
leery, two other switchers said they had decided to back the legislation as
a calculated risk out of concern over the performance of low-achieving
students in poor areas.
The departure of Governor Allen--to whom many Democrats were
loathe to hand any victory on any issue--had made the issue less partisan.
At the same time, President Bill Clinton and centrist Democrats voiced
support for charter schooling, making it increasingly acceptable. 16 One of
Hamilton's selling points to moderate Democrats was that Virginia would
be eligible for at least a million dollars in federal grant money if it passed
charter school legislation. Those moderates were also swayed by the
inclusion of a lottery system166 for student selection, alleviating their
concerns about discrimination.
Other changes also proved significant. Hamilton had made key
compromises on student selection, teacher certification, job protection for
teachers, and application of the Standards of Learning accountability
mechanism to all schools. 167 In 1996, he had added a provision mandating
that charter schools employ licensed teachers, and in 1998 he agreed to
language requiring the lottery selection of students. 168 These measures
won non-opposition and even tentative support from former foes like the
NAACP and the Virginia Education Association. In early 1998, Delegate
Dillard confided that the NAACP had "a change of heart to the point
where if they did not support [charter
school legislation], that they were
169
it."
oppose
strenuously
to
not going
After counting votes on charter schooling in the new legislature before
the 1998 session, the NAACP concluded that the legislation was going to
pass and strategically chose to focus on ensuring that the legislative
language would safeguard against any activity that could discriminate
164Id.
165
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against poor black children. 170 Emmitt Carlton, president of the Virginia
NAACP, signaled the change in 1998 when he said, "I want to make real
sure that whatever they do is quality legislation that helps urban kids and
African-American kids in poor areas succeed in education."' 171 By early
1998, the NAACP found itself essentially working on behalf of the bill, as
NAACP leaders cooperated with Hamilton to172alleviate the reservations
that some members still had regarding the bill.
Once the restricted and softened legislation made it to the floor,
moderate legislators, fearful of being labeled hostile to innovation,
produced sizable victory margins of sixty-five to thirty-three in the House
and twenty-eight to eleven in the Senate. 173 Even with support from
moderate Democrats and the NAACP, eleven of the nineteen Senate
Democrats opposed the final legislation, as did four of the five black
Senators. 174 After five years of debate, the law was signed by Governor
Gilmore in April 1998 and provided for the first charter schools to be
authorized by fall 1999.175 The law specified that each school district

could open no more than two charter schools and that charter schools must
be approved by the local district in which they would operate. 176 At least
fifty percent of charter schools in a district would have to focus on serving
at-risk students. 177 The legislation also specified that charter schools
would receive no state support, would have to apply for waivers on a
single-item basis, and had to hire certified teachers. 178 By almost any
metric, the final
legislation was among the weakest charter school laws in
179
the nation.
Implementing the Bill
With the bill's passage, the focus shifted to questions of
implementation. After tortuous and heated fights, the legislation proved to
have essentially no practical impact. In October of 1998, the U.S.
Department of Education (DOE) denied $6.8 million in funding for
Virginia's charter schools because the DOE deemed the new law as too
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181
provide adequate autonomy from the control of local school boards.
Hamilton's proposal to require local school districts to approve charter
schools dramatically undercut the legislation's practical impact. In fact, by
the fall of 1999, only about a dozen of Virginia's 133 school divisions had
even voted to accept applications for charter schools. 182 The constraints
written into the legislation provided little incentive for potential
entrepreneurs and offered no recourse from skeptical school boards; by
early 2000, little or no charter school
interest or activity was evident
1 83
divisions.
school
across Virginia's

After their initial victory, charter school advocates planned to seek
legislative amendments that would strengthen the law and broaden its
impact. During the 1999 session, the legislature passed HB 1577, a bill
permitting several jurisdictions to work together to open a regional charter
school, 184 allowing smaller localities to pool their resources. Additionally,
the House Finance Committee debated--before rejecting sixteen votes to
eight--a bill providing
tax credits up to $2500 a year for private or home
85
schooling costs.

In Virginia's fall 1999 elections, the Republicans made small gains in
the House of Delegates, claiming uncontested control of the legislature for
the first time since Reconstruction. 186 With Republican majorities in both
houses and Gilmore in the governor's office, advocates talked of taking
strides to strengthen the legislation. However, their efforts to do so would
continue to hinge on the ability of advocates to claim backing from
moderate Democrats and Republicans and on their ability to attract
support from Northern Virginia legislators.

CONCLUSION

The story of charter school legislation in Virginia is that of a fierce
fight that produced little real change. This is not as atypical a result as it
may seem. Outside the six or ten states that have moved aggressively into
charter schooling, most states with charter school laws possess only a
handful of schools.' 87 In fact, as of the fall of 1999, seventeen of the
thirty-six states with charter school legislation had twenty or fewer charter
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schools in operation. 188 By scrutinizing the fault lines and political conflict
in a state like Virginia, where the fight over charter schooling was
relatively intense, we can emerge better able to understand some of the
political complications that may lead to low levels of activity and cause
charter school implementation to move less aggressively than we might
anticipate.
Why was the road to passage so difficult in Virginia? And why was
the victory so hollow? The relative lack of success of charter school
advocates may appear particularly surprising in Virginia, given the
substantial advantages they enjoyed. They had supportive and influential
governors, growing ranks of legislative Republicans, and a relatively
conservative electorate. 189 However, scrutiny of the case suggests that
opponents enjoyed several key advantages in the fight over charter
schooling. Four factors that have been largely overlooked in discussions
of charter school politics emerge as significant.
First, legislators from the Northern Virginia suburbs were wary of
legislation that might tamper with or undercut their highly successful
school systems. 190 Perhaps the most interesting finding is the suggestion
that school quality is likely to retard support for school choice and that
states with regions that enjoy strong public schooling are likely to witness
splits along corresponding geographical lines. This is sensible, given that
the risks of charter schooling increase as the quality of the locale's public
schools increases. Because wealthy suburbs tend to have strong schools
but also frequently elect many of the Republicans and moderate
Democrats who are receptive to charter schooling, this tendency may
produce unexpected political tensions in coming years. The nature of this
split in a given state, the cohesion of the suburbs, and the relative strength
of the two factions may prove useful in understanding the fate of charter
school legislation.
Second, Virginia's troubled desegregation history lent credence and
moral heft to opponents who worried that charter schools could unravel
difficult decades of progress. 191 This point is particularly relevant given
the oft-voiced claim that charter schooling avoids the racial divisions that
characterize the voucher debate by prohibiting selective admission of
students and by creating schools that remain public schools. 192 While
charter school advocates may promote the legislation as inherently
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nondiscriminatory, 19 3 the case of Virginia suggests that the civil rights
community may reject that view and provide strong opposition to charter
schooling-particularly in states marked by racial tension or a history of
racial discrimination. 194 In the South, where memories of segregation and
the race academies of the 1950s linger, the role of traditional black
organizations may prove very influential in shaping charter schooling.
Third, the lack of any perceived educational crisis in the schools made
it difficult for advocates to press the case for a radical and potentially
risky policy. 195 The enactment of Standards of Learning under Governor
Allen helped satisfy the demands of those who wanted to see pressure
brought to bear on the schools and may have dulled the perceived need for
1 96
state action.
Fourth, the Virginia Education Association and other organized
interests were able to use their influence in a closely divided legislature to
97
insist on restrictions that served to temper the effects of the legislation. 1
However, the VEA did not oppose charter school legislation so much98as it
1
worked to ensure that enacted legislation would be largely toothless.
The politics of charter schooling in Virginia does not appear to have
been fundamentally different from that in more-studied states, though it
does appear that political constraints chafed more deeply in Virginia. Why
that may be is a question that requires more extensive comparative
research, as does the question of whether the key dimensions of the
Virginia charter school fight are present in other states with other
outcomes. So far as the future of charter schooling in Virginia, much will
depend on the partisan shape of state government, how the SOLs reshape
perceptions of school performance in the various regions of the state, and
how the key political interests respond to the changing context of
education policy in twenty-first century Virginia.
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